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ABSTRACT
Trials with highly unfavourable risk–beneﬁt ratios for
participants, like HIV cure trials, raise questions about
the quality of the consent of research participants. Why,
it may be asked, would a person with HIV who is doing
well on antiretroviral therapy be willing to jeopardise his
health by enrolling in such a trial? We distinguish three
concerns: ﬁrst, how information is communicated to
potential participants; second, participants’ motivations
for enrolling in potentially high risk research with no
prospect of direct beneﬁt; and third, participants’
understanding of the details of the trials in which they
enrol. We argue that the communication concern is
relevant to the validity of informed consent and the
quality of decision making, that the motivation concern
does not identify a genuine problem with either the
validity of consent or the quality of decision making and
that the understanding concern may not be relevant to
the validity of consent but is relevant to the quality of
decision making. In doing so, we derive guidance points
for researchers recruiting and enrolling participants into
their HIV cure trials, as well as the research ethics
committees reviewing proposed studies.
INTRODUCTION
Case: Darius is a 35-year-old African-American
man with HIV-1 infection. He takes daily Atripla—
an all-in-one combination antiretroviral therapy—
and has an undetectable viral load and a CD4 count
of 985. When Darius tested positive 10 years ago
he was deeply closeted and he considered his infec-
tion punishment for being gay. Without the
post-test counseling and social support he received
from an organization working with Black gay men,
he doubts he would still be here. As a way of giving
back, he volunteers as a treatment adherence coun-
selor. But Darius wants to do more. A nearby aca-
demic medical center is recruiting HIV-positive
participants for a trial transplanting genetically
modiﬁed cells into participants who will be taken
off their antiretroviral therapy. The purpose of the
research is to test the safety of an intervention that
might cure HIV. Darius understands the risks of
interrupting his treatment, but after reading the
consent form he is unsure about the risks of this
experimental gene transfer. The form states that:
“there may be adverse effects that are presently
unknown and unforeseeable…. The possible conse-
quences of the therapy are unknown. It could have
no effect or a positive effect …. It could also pos-
sibly cause cancer, or even spread to your repro-
ductive organs and be passed on to any future
children you may have. However, to date no such
events have been reported … so this risk is still the-
oretical.”1 Despite his uncertainty, Darius trusts the
medical center and believes in the project, so he
signs the consent form and enrols in the trial.
There is renewed interest in HIV cure research.
Eradicating the virus from the immune system’s
memory cells or CD4 Tcells once seemed impossible,
but Timothy Brown, the ‘Berlin patient’, has been
functionally cured of HIV since 2007.2 3 Others have
experienced sustained periods of viral remission after
either bone marrow transplantations or early anti-
retroviral treatments.4 Although a cure for HIV
would be tremendously valuable, the early-phase
trials currently in progress are controversial. In part,
this is because they involve non-beneﬁcial, high-risk
interventions. Almost all are proof-of-concept trials
that test the safety of high-risk interventions to clear
latent HIV proviral reservoirs or confer HIV immun-
ity, such as gene transfers or therapeutic vaccines. To
collect preliminary evidence of efﬁcacy, some involve
treatment interruption. This increases the burdens
and risks of study participation for participants like
Darius. When people with HIV adhere to a lifelong
antiretroviral regimen, they can achieve long-term
viral suppression, effectively managing their infection
as a chronic disease. Coming off the regimen
increases the likelihood of rising viral loads and
falling CD4 levels, which increases their vulnerability
to opportunistic infection. There is also no guarantee
that things will go back to normal when the study
ends and treatment is restarted. Pausing treatment
may increase the likelihood of developing HIV drug
resistance and participants may not tolerate antiretro-
viral treatment as they did before or bounce back to
pretrial health.5
Trials with highly unfavourable risk-beneﬁt ratios
for participants, like these HIV cure trials, raise
questions about the quality of the consent of
research participants. Why, it may be asked, would
a person with HIV who is doing well on antiretro-
viral therapy be willing to jeopardise his health by
enrolling in such a trial? A decision that appears so
contrary to the participant’s interests suggests to
some that something must have gone awry in the
decision-making process.
Three speciﬁc concerns about consent have been
raised in the literature on HIV cure research. The
ﬁrst focuses on communication. Some commenta-
tors worry about the use of certain terms or
phrases that they think have the potential to gener-
ate misconceptions or misunderstandings.6–8 For
example, the use of the label ‘HIV cure’ to describe
non-beneﬁcial proof-of-concept research might be
inappropriate, given the tendency of research parti-
cipants in early-phase trials to overestimate the ben-
eﬁts of study participation.8 The research is
increasingly focused on achieving sustained viral
remission as opposed to a functional cure,9 which
deepens the worry that this language is misleading.
The second set of concerns are about participant
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motivation. Some commentators question whether enrolment
decisions are truly voluntary when they are motivated out of a
deep sense of obligation to the community, as Darius’ was,
rather than primarily for the medical beneﬁt of the partici-
pant.10 The third set comprises concerns about understanding.
Research participants frequently fail to recall facts about risk,
uncertainty, and complex study designs and interventions.11 12
Given the nature of HIV cure research, some commentators
have argued that all HIV cure trials should include a formal
assessment of prospective participants’ understanding of the
trial’s key features as part of the consent process.13
In this paper, we assess the validity of these concerns about
consent and consider how they should be addressed. We distin-
guish two goals of the informed consent process—to obtain
valid consent and to facilitate good decision making. We argue
that the communication concern is relevant to the validity of
informed consent and the quality of decision making, that the
motivation concern does not identify a genuine problem with
either the validity of consent or the quality of decision making
and that the understanding concern may not be relevant to the
validity of consent but is relevant to the quality of decision
making. In doing so, we derive guidance points for researchers
recruiting and enrolling participants into their HIV cure trials,
as well as the research ethics committees (RECs) reviewing pro-
posed studies.
THE INFORMED CONSENT PROCESS
The informed consent process has two central goals that are
relevant to our concerns about risky trials. The ﬁrst is an ethical
requirement: to obtain valid consent. The second is an ethical
aspiration: to facilitate good decision making.
The primary goal of the informed consent process is to
obtain valid consent. All people have rights against interference
with their bodies and property. In the absence of a very good
reason, the violation of one of these rights constitutes a serious
wrong. For example, if a researcher were to inject you with an
experimental HIV vaccine without your permission, she would
violate your rights. Competent adults, by virtue of their capacity
for autonomous action, have the power to waive their rights
against interference through giving consent. Valid consent can
transform an act that would otherwise be a rights violation into
no violation at all. Had you given valid consent to the
researcher to perform exactly the same action, no rights viola-
tion would have occurred. Almost all clinical research involves
acts that require consent. Hence, the valid consent of competent
research participants is an ethical requirement for almost all
clinical research.
A secondary goal of the informed consent process is to facili-
tate good decision making. An individual is more likely to make
a good decision about study enrolment—that is, a decision that
ﬁts with his values and preferences—if he understands the infor-
mation that is relevant to that decision. By disclosing what is
known about the research in an understandable way and by
making themselves available to answer questions or supplement
the information disclosed, researchers provide prospective parti-
cipants with the opportunity to make good decisions about
enrolment. Although facilitating good decision making is a laud-
able goal of the informed consent process, there cannot be an
ethical requirement to ensure that prospective participants make
good decisions. A competent adult’s right to decide for himself
includes the liberty to make those decisions well or poorly.
Unlike with small children, who lack the capacity to decide for
themselves, other people may not force a competent adult to do
what he has most reason to do. He is free to make his own
decisions for his own reasons. Crucially, we will argue, the
amount of information that potential participants must under-
stand to give valid consent may be substantially less than they
need to understand to make a good decision.
Two implications follow from this analysis. When enrolling a
prospective participant, like Darius, into an HIV cure trial, the
researcher is (1) required to obtain his valid consent, but (2)
only encouraged to help him make a good decision. It would
violate Darius’ rights to enrol him if the researcher believes his
consent is invalid, but not if she merely believes his decision
does not reﬂect his values. Since the facilitation of high-quality
decision making is not an ethical requirement of the informed
consent process, other ethical considerations can trump it. For
example, it would be unreasonable to expect a research team to
achieve this aspirational ideal for all their research participants
if doing so would be so costly that it would jeopardise the pro-
gress of socially valuable research.
With these goals of the informed consent process in mind, we
now consider the concerns about consent to HIV cure research.
THE COMMUNICATION CONCERN
Certain aspects of research are hard to explain in lay terms.
Others butt up against deep-seated misconceptions or false
expectations. Take the poorly understood concepts of random-
isation and double-blinding. Even the clearest explanation of the
design of a double-blind randomised controlled trial would be
unlikely to convey the study design to a prospective participant
who began with the belief that his doctor would not have
recommended study participation if he were not guaranteed to
be in the treatment arm. Designing an informed consent process
to achieve successful communication involves understanding
which aspects of research are poorly understood and why. Only
then can targeted efforts be made to escape potential partici-
pants’ misconceptions and false expectations.
The large body of research on heuristics and cognitive biases
identiﬁes a variety of factors that inﬂuence decision
making.14 15 In the clinical research context, certain cues may
serve to signal that the activities are safe or familiar, which can
prompt quick or less considered judgements about study enrol-
ment. Others signal instead that the research is not as safe or
familiar as it might at ﬁrst seem, thereby motivating careful
deliberation about study enrolment.
Some of these cues are surprisingly subtle. One study found
that when a research study is described as a ‘clinical investiga-
tion’, as opposed to an ‘experiment’, participants assume a
higher degree of certainty, fewer risks and a greater chance of
individual beneﬁt.16 The study did not assess whether these
expectations were accurate, but even so Dubé et al recommend
that HIV cure studies be described as ‘experiments’, so as to
counter the tendency to underestimate the risks of study partici-
pation.9 Other surveys on consent forms for early-phase
research ﬁnd that information is often presented in vague,
inconsistent and misleading ways.11 12 17–19 The consent form
that Darius signs is a case in point. He is confused by the pres-
entation of the gene transfer’s unknown risks, and the experi-
mental intervention is referred to as a ‘therapy’, which conveys
a mixed message about the probability of individual beneﬁt.
Similar concerns apply to the phrase ‘HIV cure research’. Given
the goals of the research, the label seems misleading.9
Participants in early-phase trials tend to overestimate the bene-
ﬁts of study participation.20–23 Even if some trials are research-
ing a functional cure, the worry is that the language of ‘cure’
might suggest an unwarranted prospect of being cured of HIV
and so motivate some participants to take on excessive risks.
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The communication concern is a genuine threat to the valid-
ity of informed consent. To understand why, we must return to
our previous discussion of valid consent. A competent adult has
the right to control certain aspects of his own life, including
what happens to his body. When another person exercises
illegitimate control over his decisions about what happens to his
body, this right is violated. Imagine that Darius has an acquaint-
ance, Thora, who wants him to participate in an HIV cure trial.
She threatens to divulge his HIV status to his family unless he
enrols in the trial, so he does as she says. In this case, Thora
coerces Darius into giving consent, which renders his consent
invalid.
Coercion is one way in which one person can wrest agency
from another; but it is not the only way. Suppose that Aaliyah is
a member of the research team, responsible for drafting the
consent form. She also has an interest in Darius enrolling in the
study. Were she to withhold the risks of the experimental gene
transfer from him, she would also exercise illegitimate control
over his enrolment decision. She effectively denies him access to
information that she knows and has reason to believe would be
relevant to his decision.1 Exercising this kind of control under-
mines the voluntariness of his decision and can thereby invali-
date his consent.24
In research, control through outright coercion or deception is
rare. Darius is more likely to have his enrolment decision con-
trolled by the way in which information is disclosed to him. We
have already outlined some of the ways in which the consent
form he signs fails to give him a fair opportunity to understand
facts about risks and beneﬁts that are probably relevant to his
enrolment decision. Here is another example. Suppose that
Aaliyah discloses everything she ought to, but does so using sci-
entiﬁc jargon. The consent form is riddled with sentences like:
“A risk of the experimental gene transfer is off-target mutagen-
esis.” Most people do not know what that is, let alone how
serious it is. Choosing to describe the risk in this way effectively
denies participants access to information that is likely to be rele-
vant to their enrolment decisions. If Darius consents to enrol-
ment, Aaliyah may not have coerced him or lied by omission,
but she has still undermined the voluntariness of his decision by
inappropriate disclosure.
This analysis provides the ﬁrst set of general guidance points
for those overseeing and conducting HIV cure research. To
respect a competent adult’s right to make an enrolment decision
for himself, a researcher ought to disclose all the information
about the research that she has good reason to think may be
relevant to a prospective participant’s decision. If the research is
actually focused on viral remission as opposed to a functional
cure, she ought to avoid the language of cure. She ought to dis-
close the relevant information in the prospective participant’s
native or preferred language, at an appropriate level of complex-
ity, using clear and consistent language, and with an eye to
avoiding known sources of misconception or misunderstanding.
She ought also to give him an opportunity to ask questions so
that he can ﬁnd out what she knows about anything else that he
considers relevant to an enrolment decision. Otherwise put,
HIV cure researchers, and RECs that oversee these trials, ought
to ensure that the informed consent process gives prospective
participants a fair opportunity to understand the information
that is relevant to making a good decision about study enrol-
ment. This is an ethical requirement for obtaining valid consent.
THE MOTIVATION CONCERN
Not all participants misunderstand the research they are
enrolled in. A patient enrolling in an HIV cure study may under-
stand that he is taking on considerable risks and that he will not
be cured of his infection. Like Darius, he may be motivated to
enrol by a desire to give back. Given the rich history of activism
and altruism among this particular patient population, HIV cure
researchers expect many participants to be altruistically moti-
vated.10 However, in order for their consent to be valid, it must
be proffered voluntarily. The motivation concern is a worry
about whether people who are motivated by such a strong sense
of duty to beneﬁt others are acting voluntarily.10
It is important not to reduce prospective participants’ inter-
ests to medical interests or their reasons for acting to self-
interested ones. Non-beneﬁcial, high-risk research is not in
Darius’ medical interests, but study participation may still
further his non-medical interests. He clearly judges this research
to be important and valuable; this is a project he wants to con-
tribute to and be a part of. Moreover, we often have good
reasons to help other people. Some of these reasons may consti-
tute genuine moral obligations, while others may be supereroga-
tory. Either way, there is nothing, in principle, more suspect
about someone acting out of a desire to beneﬁt others than out
of a desire to beneﬁt himself.
This analysis implies that the motivation concern does not
identify a problem with the validity of consent to HIV cure
research. A person motivated to enrol in a high-risk trial by a
desire to beneﬁt others may give perfectly valid consent. Those
recruiting and overseeing research do have reason to be con-
cerned about the validity of consent when illegitimate control
has been exercised, such as via threats or manipulation. Given
the risky nature of the research, RECs ought to require HIV
cure researchers to ask prospective participants to explain why
they have chosen to enrol. Provided that that explanation makes
no reference to illegitimate control, the resultant token of
consent ought to be accepted. As we have seen, altruistically
minded participants, like Darius, can give very cogent explana-
tions of why they are taking on risks for others. Researchers and
RECs therefore should not prevent such an altruistically moti-
vated person from enrolling if his proffered consent is otherwise
valid and if he is otherwise eligible.
Consider now the relevance of being motivated by altruism to
the second goal of the informed consent process. If someone
values helping people with HIV through research, then allowing
him to enrol in a study for altruistic reasons is improving his
decision making. He is then better able to live his own life by
his own lights. The motivation concern therefore does not iden-
tify a problem with the aspirational goal of facilitating good
decision making either.
THE UNDERSTANDING CONCERN
A large body of evidence shows that participants have variable,
but often poor, understanding of the research they have enrolled
in.11 12 For example, an interview study of participants in phase
I cancer trials at a US Academic Medical Center found that only
31% understood the purpose of the research, even though 96%
thought that they were well-informed before they agreed to par-
ticipate.22 Is it permissible to enrol willing individuals into risky
HIV cure trials knowing that some are likely to have failed to
grasp key aspects of the study? This is the understanding
concern.
1To exercise this kind of control she need not have a malevolent
intention, she need only be responsible for withholding or
misrepresenting information that is expected to be relevant to the
decision being made.
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When we turn to the two goals of the informed consent
process, we ﬁnd that they have differing implications regarding
understanding. If the goal is to facilitate good decision making,
participants should understand as many of the facts that are
material to their decision as possible. These may include facts
about the purpose of the research, the risks and potential bene-
ﬁts of study participation, the clinical alternatives to enrolment,
other studies they might be eligible for, investigator conﬂicts of
interest, and so forth.25 On the other hand, if the goal is merely
to obtain valid consent, potential participants only need to
understand what the acts are that they are being asked to
consent to, not additional facts about the purpose for which
these acts are being performed or about the acts’ risks and
beneﬁts.
This last claim requires defence. In the research ethics litera-
ture, it is widely assumed that a lot of information needs to be
understood to give valid consent to an act.26–30 The act’s asso-
ciated risks are usually among those facts. But it is possible to
give valid consent to an act when ignorant of its risks. Consider
an informed consent process in which Aaliyah, our HIV
researcher, discloses information about the risks of an experi-
mental gene transfer:
Unknown risk: Aaliyah knows that the experimental gene transfer
has risks A and B. But unknown to her, it also has risk C. No sci-
entist knows or has publicly hypothesized risk C. Aaliyah dis-
closes that the experimental gene transfer has risks A and B, and
that there maybe further unknown risks. Darius consents to the
gene transfer.
Assuming that Aaliyah’s disclosure is otherwise impeccable,
Darius’ consent is valid. One goal of early-phase research is to
learn about the risks of an experimental intervention.
Consenting to study participation therefore involves consenting
to acts for which some of the risks are unknown. Unknown risks
illustrates that it is possible to give valid consent to an act
without understanding its attendant risks.
Sometimes not being told about a risk does invalidate
consent. Consider a variant on the case:
Undisclosed known risk: Aaliyah knows that the experimental
gene transfer has risks A, B and C. She discloses A and B, but
withholds C. Darius consents to the gene transfer.
Darius’ consent is clearly invalid. He is also ignorant of a
known risk, namely risk C. But Unknown risk shows that his
ignorance of risk C is not sufﬁcient to explain why his consent
is invalid, since in both cases Darius is told and understands the
same information. Instead, what makes the difference to the val-
idity of his consent is the illegitimate control Aaliyah exercises
over Darius in the second but not the ﬁrst case. He is ignorant
of risk C because Aaliyah voluntarily withholds this fact from
him. Her illegitimate control invalidates his consent just as
surely as fraud invalidates a contract. By contrast, she has no
control over his decision in Unknown risk, because she does not
know about risk C either.
What if she exercises no such control, yet Darius fails to
understand what she knows and believes is relevant to his
enrolment decision? Consider the following variant on our
case.
Disclosed known risk: Aaliyah knows that the experimental gene
transfer has risks A, B and C. She discloses all these risks and
explains that there may be further unknown risks. Darius under-
stands what the gene transfer involves, but having already
decided to participate in the trial he stops paying attention to
what Aaliyah tells him about the risks halfway through and
doesn’t process what she says about risk C. He signs the consent
form ignorant of risk C.
Assuming that Aaliyah’s disclosure is otherwise impeccable, it
may be unclear whether Darius’ consent is valid. While we are
not troubled by his failure to understand a fact that would be
relevant to his enrolment decision but is unknown to all parties
to the consent transaction, we may be troubled by his ignorance
of facts that Aaliyah knows.
However, the analysis that explained our intuitions in the ﬁrst
two cases implies that Darius’ consent is actually valid in
Disclosed known risk. The relationship between disclosure and
control explains our intuitions in Unknown risk and Undisclosed
known risk. In Unknown risk, Aaliyah is in no better epistemic
position than Darius with regard to risk C. She is therefore not
in a position to exercise illegitimate control over his enrolment
decision by withholding or misrepresenting this fact. In
Undisclosed known risk, she is in a better epistemic position
than Darius with regard to risk C, and she voluntarily withholds
it despite having reason to believe that it would be relevant to
his enrolment decision. She therefore exercises illegitimate
control over this decision by withholding this fact. If we gener-
alise from these cases, the analysis that explained our intuitions
in the ﬁrst two cases implies that Darius’ consent is perfectly
valid in Disclosed known risk. Aaliyah discloses everything she
knows and believes is relevant to Darius’ enrolment decision in
a way that he could understand ( just as he did understand risks
A and B) and thereby exercises no illegitimate control over his
consent.
It might be objected that nothing in our analysis precludes the
possibility that a fact about understanding might also explain the
intuition. The bilateral nature of consent might tempt us to think
that Darius needs to understand what Aaliyah knows about the
research in order to give valid consent to study participation. But
why think that this is true? It is natural to think that in order to
give valid consent, Darius needs to understand all the true propo-
sitions about the research. But Unknown risk shows that this is
impossible. And since some risks are unknown to all, Aaliyah has
no epistemic access to this complete set of true propositions. It is
therefore unclear why Darius’ consent is invalid when he fails to
understand facts that she understands. She, after all, is just
another agent with imperfect knowledge about the research. As
long as she discloses what she knows honestly and clearly—that
is, she gives him a fair opportunity to understand—she discharges
the duty not to invalidate his consent by way of illegitimate
control. There is no further explanation that entails that we
ought to hold the validity of his consent hostage to whether he
understands what she happens to know about the research.
IMPLICATIONS FOR HIV CURE RESEARCHERS AND RECS
This analysis might seem to leave RECs and researchers rudder-
less, but it actually reveals options. To see this, consider a more
troubling case:
Overly optimistic: Luis has a complicated relationship with his
homosexuality and HIV status. He comes from a family and com-
munity that stigmatize both and lives in fear of being exposed as
HIV-positive. Feelings of fear and shame motivated him to avoid
testing, prevention and treatment services for many years, despite
high-risk sexual encounters with older men. When Luis learns of
the HIV cure trial, he is eager to enrol. “I could be the one
who’s cured!” he tells the research nurse conducting the initial
screening.
When an HIV cure trial is otherwise ethical and in compli-
ance with the regulations and guidelines, it might be ethically
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permissible to enrol a participant like Luis, even if his powerful
desire to be rid of a stigmatising condition leads him to overesti-
mate his chance of cure. Provided that he has been given fair
opportunity to understand the risks and beneﬁts, Luis’ token of
consent could still be valid.
However, the ethical aspiration to facilitate good decision
making would not be met in this case. Provided that it does not
impose excessive burdens on the research team or others, and
provided that it does not interfere with any other ethical
requirements, it would be laudable for researchers and RECs to
do more to help potential participants to make good decisions.
Here, we brieﬂy outline a process by which they might do so.
Researchers and RECs might supplement the standard
informed consent process with an extended discussion and
require prospective participants to pass a comprehension test
before enrolling. Everything we know about participant compre-
hension suggests that it is variable across a number of areas.11
But researchers and RECs are unlikely to improve overall under-
standing if they attempt to address too many areas of potential
confusion in their extended discussions.31 Rather they ought to
anticipate and prioritise the most serious misunderstandings or
gaps in knowledge and discuss these with the prospective par-
ticipant one-on-one. By testing the understanding of a potential
participant, like Luis, after the study has been explained to him,
some areas of misunderstanding can be identiﬁed. By then con-
versing with him, a researcher may come to understand what is
motivating his enrolment decision and be able to address his
misconceptions head on. Several systematic reviews ﬁnd that
extended discussions, particularly one-on-one conversations
between a member of the research team and a prospective par-
ticipant, have the most consistent results in improving poor
understanding.11 32 33
Although it would not violate Luis’ rights to enrol him
without testing his comprehension or engaging in re-education
to facilitate good decision making, we recommend that research-
ers and RECs go through such a process when they have reason
to think that prospective participants may harbour serious mis-
understandings. It is true that such interventions would impede
prospective participants’ freedom of choice. After all, unless he
exhibited substantial understanding, Luis would not be permit-
ted to enrol despite proffering his valid consent. But this would
not constitute an objectionable form of paternalism. No one, we
assume, has a right to participate in a phase I HIV cure study
and so it is permissible for researchers to refuse enrolment even
to people who autonomously proffer their consent. For
example, researchers may decide against enrolling Luis if his
misconception is recalcitrant. The requirement would also add
to the researchers’ workload. But given the low numbers of par-
ticipants in early-phase trials, these tests are not likely to over-
burden anyone or impede the progress of socially valuable
research. Thus, even though the understanding concern does
not threaten the validity of consent, it may still be worth addres-
sing for the sake of beneﬁting the potential participants.
CONCLUSION
HIV cure trials have raised understandable concerns about the
informed consent of HIV-positive participants. Here, we have
distinguished three separate concerns: about how information is
communicated to potential participants, about potential partici-
pants’ motivations for enrolling in potentially high risk research
with no prospect of direct beneﬁt and about participants’ under-
standing of the details of the trials in which they enrol.
The ﬁrst concern is genuine: poor communication can
threaten the validity of consent. The consent process should be
designed so that potential participants are given a fair opportun-
ity to understand the information that is relevant to their deci-
sion and, speciﬁcally, so that misconceptions about the
likelihood of beneﬁt are avoided. The concern about motivation
does not threaten the validity of consent: there is nothing more
problematic about being motivated by the interests of others
than by one’s own interests. The understanding concern is more
complex. Though it is possible to give valid consent without
understanding all the facts that might be relevant to one’s deci-
sion, it is nevertheless a laudable aspiration for participants to
understand enough to make a good decision by their own lights.
In the context of early-phase HIV cure research, additional mea-
sures to improve understanding could beneﬁt potential partici-
pants without imposing excessive costs or burdens on
researchers.
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